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The Allure of the Radical: 
Understanding Jihadist Violence 
in the West
Kabir Sethi
Why did a young man, who was neither poor nor oppressed, 
who had received a decent education, a man who never had 
trouble making friends, who enjoyed smoking dope and drinking 
beer, why would such a man turn into a holy warrior whose only 
wish was to kill, and perhaps more mysteriously, to die?
Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam
I. Introduction
Grand proclamations of world peace and prosperity, so famously 
made by scholars and politicians alike in the immediate aftermath of 
the Cold War, today seem naïve and almost laughable. Francis Fuku-
yama, writing as the Berlin Wall came down, believed that we were 
witnessing “Not just the end of the Cold War…but the end of his-
tory as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolu-
tion and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government.”1 For better or worse, that has not been 
the case. To use Benjamin Barber’s words, we seem to be witnessing 
“retribalization” rather than “McWorld.” The fall of Communism as a 
global political movement did not bring an end to anti-Western senti-
ment in the world, as testified to by annual riots in India on Valen-
tine’s Day, anti-American rallies in South Korea and Japan, and Peru 
and Venezuela’s explicitly anti-Western regimes. One violent move-
ment in particular, though, has especially caught the imagination of 
the West, the movement that is commonly referred to as “Islamic ter-
rorism,” “global jihad,” or “contemporary jihadist violence.” Part of 
what makes this movement so noticeable is its seemingly global reach 
and appeal. From bombings in Bali, Indonesia, to attacks in India, the 
Middle East, Europe, and all the way to the United States, “Islamic ter-
rorism” seems to have spread across the world. This essay addresses 
the appeal of radical and violent interpretations of Islam in continental 
Western Europe and the United States.
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Scholars have attempted to understand globalist radical Islam in a 
number of ways, indicating that there is no simple explanation. Rec-
ognizing that this is an important first step in dealing with the larger 
questions at hand, a mechanical cause-and-effect explanation will 
always provide only an incomplete picture. There is no one trigger that 
has suddenly inspired Muslims to become holy warriors, and attempt-
ing to identify such a factor is an exercise in futility. Instead, a more 
organic approach, which takes into account a multitude of events at 
the local, national, and international levels—each that must be treated 
separately but also as part of the whole—gives us a more nuanced and 
accurate explanation for contemporary jihadist violence. This essay is 
an attempt to understand globalist radical Islam in the West from a 
multi-dimensional, historically contextual perspective. It is therefore 
important to look at trends and transformations taking place at the 
micro, “meso,” and macro levels. Specifically, this means looking at 
individual case studies, national or regional occurrences, and trans-
national trends. While this study does not comprehensively address 
each of these issues, the aim is to expand current lines of reasoning, 
which are often focused on either the micro-historic (examining only 
the present) or the macro-historic (exaggerating the role of historical 
identities) level. I attempt to bridge this divide by first providing his-
torical context to contemporary jihadist violence and then focusing on 
understanding the significance of globalization. By comparing the rad-
icalization processes in Western Europe and the United States, I hope 
to add empirical substance to my theoretical base. It must be added 
here that identity construction, jihadist or otherwise, contains a level 
of individual variation and choice that is difficult to conceptualize but 
important to keep in mind.
Clearly defining “globalist radical Islam” is an important first step 
in research that attempts to understand this phenomenon. Therefore, 
part two begins with a discussion of this and other key concepts. Sec-
tion three provides a brief overview of the extant literature, arguing 
that despite many noteworthy contributions, there is a tendency to 
focus exclusively on either the historical side of things or to look only 
at the present. In sections four and five, I attempt to bridge this divide 
by first offering a brief historical overview of Islam and then focusing 
on contemporary trends and transformations. Section six discusses the 
radicalization processes in the United States and Europe respectively, 
and is followed by a case study of Mohammed B., the murderer of 
Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. I conclude with thoughts on how we 
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may limit the appeal of violent radical Islam, arguing that adopting a 
cosmopolitan approach at the individual, state, and transnational level 
may be the only way to live in an era of ever increasing globalization.
II. Key Concepts: Contemporary Jihadist Violence, Religiosity, 
Deterritorialization, and Globalization
It is important to make very clear that violent interpretations of the 
Qur’an are subscribed to by a tiny minority of the world’s Muslims. 
In addition, violent groups that claim to be inspired by Islam exist in 
many parts of the world and applying a singular narrative to all would 
be a mistake. Muslim groups fighting for secession in Thailand and 
Taliban forces attacking foreign troops and local citizens in Afghani-
stan both use violence, yet their reasons for doing so are largely, per-
haps even entirely, unrelated. Consequently, the terminology I have 
been using so far (contemporary jihadist violence, globalist radical 
Islam) needs to be specifically defined. For the purposes of this essay, 
I use these terms interchangeably to refer to the loosely connected 
global movement that traces its roots to Sayid Qutb’s theology. Spe-
cifically, this involves placing violent jihad as a pseudo sixth pillar of 
Islam. These groups generally belong under the umbrella organiza-
tion Al Qaeda and are supported—financially, technically, or simply 
ideologically—by Osama bin Laden’s group. As declared by Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, chief ideologue of Al Qaeda, the main objectives of the 
organization2 are to create a global Caliphate, which would essentially 
be a radical, sharia-based Islamic state (Taliban Afghanistan being an 
example of this form of governance); remove “foreigners” from the 
Muslim holy lands; and, specifically referring to Saudi Arabia, bring 
an end to hereditary government.3
Religiosity is defined as the relationship of an individual with 
his/her religion and religion’s influence on said individual’s choices. 
Deterritorialization is the weakening relationship between culture and 
place. I use the term to specifically refer to the “blurring of the borders 
between Islam and the West” through the process of globalization.4 
Like globalization, deterritorialization can be traced back through his-
tory, but the scale and scope at which it is occurring now is unprec-
edented.
While there is no universally agreed upon definition of the term, 
I use “globalization” to refer to a sweeping phenomenon character-
ized by time-space compression5 and “rapidly developing and ever-
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densening networks of interconnections and interdependences that 
characterize modern social life.”6 In this epoch of globalization, the 
most pressing issues are transnational and therefore require a collec-
tive global response. It is also important to point out that globalization 
occurs on a number of levels—cultural, political, economic, to name a 
few—and results in varying degrees of both fragmentation and inte-
gration.7
III. Current Approaches
The outpouring of literature in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (though 
in all fairness there were notable contributions before 2001 as well) has 
attempted to explain this contemporary jihadist violence in a variety 
of ways: as a response to American anti-Muslim foreign policy, a con-
tinuation of Islam’s imperial history, or a part of Samuel Huntington’s 
inevitable “Clash of Civilizations,” for example. These explanations 
can be divided into three broad categories: the theological school, the 
historical school, and the situational school. I will not engage with 
the first, which argues that the Qur’an inherently incites violence, for 
two simple reasons; first, I have no training in Qur’anic studies, and 
second, as Olivier Roy notes, “the key question is not what the Koran 
actually says, but what Muslims say the Koran says.”8 I focus instead 
on the historical and situational approaches to understanding globalist 
radical Islam.
Theorists belonging to the historical school argue that the jihadist 
violence we are seeing today is inextricably linked with the history 
of Islam and/or the world. Huntington, whose famous 1992 “Clash 
of Civilizations” essay categorizes the world into several inherently 
conflictual civilizations, belongs to this school of thought. He sees the 
“Muslim Civilization” as a monolithic entity that finds itself at war 
with the Western, Hindu, Orthodox, and other civilizations. In a simi-
lar vein, Efraim Karsh argues that Islam is inherently imperialistic and 
present day violence is a continuation of this historical trend.9
On the other hand, the situational group focuses on the present 
state of the Muslim world and argues that anti-Western jihad can be 
explained through specific, contemporary reasons. Examples can be 
found in theories that see groups like Al Qaeda as reacting to Ameri-
can foreign policy, Israeli treatment of Palestine and Palestinians, or the 
absence of a Muslim voice on the global stage. It is important to look at 
Olivier Roy’s work here, as he argues that the rise of Islamic neo-funda-
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mentalism can be explained as a response to the increasingly pervasive 
effects of globalization. Referring specifically to Muslim immigrants, 
Roy explains neo-fundamentalism by arguing that it results from the 
efforts of globalized Muslims to assert their identity in a non-Muslim 
context.
In this article, I take a position in between this debate, arguing that 
to understand violent Islam in the West, we must look at the history 
of Islam but also focus on contemporary realities, especially the phe-
nomenon of globalization. Using only one of these tracks leaves us 
with an insufficient explanation. Mohammed Ayoob is a rare scholar 
in that he takes into account the history of Islam but also acknowl-
edges the importance of looking at present day realities. For Ayoob, 
the emergence of neo-fundamentalism is “a result of their [Muslims] 
search for an explanation for past humiliations and a remedy for the 
present plight of Muslims,” which is why “Islamists, from Morocco to 
Indonesia, advocate a return to the imagined pristine purity of early 
Islam and cling to a romanticized notion of a golden age.”10 To Ayoob’s 
analysis it is important to add Roy’s work, focused on globalization 
and deterritorialization, to more completely understand contemporary 
jihadist violence. In addition, the role of the jihadist “project” must also 
be acknowledged. Before reaching the situational discussion, however, 
it is important to look at the history of Islam.
IV. Two Levels of Observation
A. Providing Historical Context
While understanding that it is simplistic to associate a monolithic nar-
rative with a religion as vast as Islam, it is not surprising that scholars 
across the board11 see the Islamic civilization as having fallen from its 
zenith some 800 years ago. The pendulum of power and knowledge has 
swung from a point in the 12th and 13th centuries, when the Muslim 
world was seen as the centre and the West the periphery, to the pres-
ent day, when no country with a Muslim majority holds a permanent 
seat on the United Nations Security Council and none of the world’s 
elite educational institutions are located in Muslim majority states.12 
This section looks at what has happened in these 800 years with an eye 
toward understanding the contemporary situation of Muslims. While 
I support my arguments in this section with a variety of sources, the 
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general structure of the argument is based on Ahmed Samatar’s frame-
work of the “three humiliations of Islam.”13
As early as the 10th century, “Europeans recognized Muslim intel-
lectual superiority, and quickly began translating Muslim works in 
such fields as medicine, astronomy, mathematics, and philosophy 
from Arabic into Latin.”14 By the 11th century, the best universities in 
Europe were in Al-Andalus (parts of present day Portugal and most of 
Spain) while the library of Baghdad was reputed to be the greatest in 
the world. Due in part to its economic clout, political power, and geo-
graphical location, which allowed scholars in the Middle East to syn-
thesize past knowledge from China, India, Persia, Greece, and Rome, 
the region became the global center of knowledge. Many, if not most, of 
the major scientific advances of medieval times were made in the Mus-
lim world, in fields as diverse as mathematics, medicine, architecture, 
and astronomy. It was in the middle of the 13th century, however, that 
the first of the three humiliations began.
The first step in Islam’s fall from medieval glory was the start of 
the Spanish Reconquista, with Cordoba falling in 1236 and the sacking 
of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258.15 This was followed by the con-
tinuing Crusades, the replacement of the Middle East as the center of 
trade (after the colonization of the Americas and Vasco de Gama’s jour-
ney around the Cape), and the re-Christianization of Spain by 1492. 
Simultaneously, as noted by Ibn Khaldun, there was the demise of the 
respect for reason and a weakening of learning in the Muslim world, 
as rulers sought to regain power by strengthening and supporting 
soldiers rather than scholars. As the Renaissance and then Enlighten-
ment took place in Europe, the center of knowledge and power moved 
definitively out of the Muslim world.16 The first humiliation, a fall 
from the zenith of world civilization, was complete.
The second humiliation was the colonial experience in the 19th and 
20th centuries. While the Ottoman Empire commanded a large ter-
ritory, its influence by the late 1800s was waning and, after the First 
World War, it collapsed altogether. At the same time, England ruled 
millions of Muslims in India (including Bangladesh and Pakistan), 
Sudan, and Yemen; the Dutch ruled Indonesia; and the French con-
trolled Lebanon, Syria, and much of North Africa. Winston Churchill 
expressed the triumph of the West when he asserted “that the dog in 
a manger had no final right to the manger even though he may have 
lain there a very long time.” Europe saw its colonies, including the vast 
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majority of the Muslim world, as inferior and unworthy of self-rule. 
The experience of colonialism was the second humiliation.
The post-colonial moment failed to resurrect Islam. On the contrary, 
the Muslim world continued and continues to fall further behind the 
West. While a group of Muslim states with relatively small populations 
are economically wealthy (Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia, and a few others), the vast majority of Muslims live in 
relative poverty. According to data collected by the World Bank in 
2000, the average annual income in Muslim countries was half of the 
world average. In addition, when we look at the relative conditions of 
Israel and its neighbors, the comparison becomes starker still. Bernard 
Lewis notes:
In the 1990s the combined gross national products of Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon—that is, three of Israel’s neighbors—were considerably smaller 
than that of Israel alone. The per capita figures are worse. According to 
United Nations statistics, Israel’s per capita GDP was 3.5 times that of 
Lebanon and Syria, 12 times that of Jordan, and 13.5 times that of Egypt. 
The contrast with the West, and now with the Far East, is even more 
disconcerting.17
Notably, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon are significantly wealthier 
than Niger, Sierra Leone, or Afghanistan—the poorest of the Muslim 
countries. The weak economic situation of Muslim countries, espe-
cially when considered relative to Israel and the West, is significant in 
explaining the frustrations of Muslim youth. This sentiment has been 
capitalized on by radical leaders like Bin Laden, who stated in October 
2001:
Our nation has been tasting this humiliation and contempt for more than 
80 years. Its sons are being killed, its blood is being shed, its holy places 
are being attacked, and it is not being ruled according to what God has 
decreed.18
Some of the factors that contribute to the feeling of “humiliation and 
contempt” are the establishment of Israel and its subsequent alliance 
with the United States, victories over various Arab states and alliances, 
and the occupation of Palestine; the success of the militantly secu-
lar, democratic, and modern state of Turkey, which emerged from the 
ruins of the Islamic Ottoman Empire; the failure of political Islam; non-
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Islamic control of Jerusalem; and the foreign presence in Saudi Arabia 
(“the land of Muhammad”).
Yet the humiliation is not entirely real. It is reinforced by a (some-
times unconscious) tendency in the West to look down on the Islamic 
world, seeing it as lacking the Western virtues of reason and rationality. 
In his seminal 1978 work Orientalism, Edward Said discusses the rep-
resentation of Muslims and the Muslim world by Western, specifically 
British and French, agents. He argues that these representations, which 
function at many levels, including the arts, politics, and academia, 
work within a coded discourse that carries certain ideological aims. 
These aims have changed over time, from colonialism to the desire 
for oil or control of territory. Orientalism creates and magnifies the 
divide between East and West, showing the West as enlightened and 
superior. When such discourse is internalized by Muslims themselves, 
the historical humiliations become exacerbated. While it is true that 
scholarship today is less bound up in oriental discourse than before 
Said’s treatise, undercurrents of European/Enlightenment superiority 
still exist. As Amartya Sen notes in his 2002 essay, “How to Judge Glo-
balism,” a common understanding of globalization is that it is “a gift 
from the West to the world,” while in reality the phenomenon, espe-
cially when understood historically, has truly global roots. Yet even 
though the first known republic was in Vaishali, India, and Muslim 
rulers in medieval times were far more pluralistic than their Chris-
tian counterparts, and the first modern scientists worked in Baghdad 
and Al Andalus, the concepts of “Democracy” and “Pluralism” and 
“Reason” are considered entirely Western. It is not difficult to accept 
that sentiments of inferiority are heightened among Muslims living in 
Europe or the United States, having been taught that everything good 
has come from the West.
To summarize, part of the frustration experienced by Western Mus-
lims can be explained by looking at Islam’s three historical humilia-
tions. Whether or not these humiliations are real or imagined is not 
the main point. Rather, it is important to acknowledge that these can 
have tremendous power to motivate, especially when mixed with situ-
ational frustrations.
B. Situational Factors
The third humiliation, the post-colonial experience, brings us to the 
turn of the 21st century. This historical narrative, however, does not 
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adequately deal with two important and intertwined developments, 
namely, the rapid increase in globalization starting at the end of the 
1980s, and the “project” behind globalist radical Islam.
Olivier Roy’s work on contemporary jihadist violence nuances our 
understanding of the phenomenon by explicitly discussing the forces 
of globalization. In particular, Roy looks at the experience of the Mus-
lim diaspora in the West, noting that, “a third of the world’s Muslims 
now live as members of a minority.”19 Roy’s central argument is that 
neo-fundamentalism is a result of Muslims trying to assert their iden-
tity in a globalized, non-Muslim context. Traditionally, the immigrant 
experience in the West has been explained through either assimilation 
(sacrificing unique cultural practices to become Western), multicultur-
alism (cultural practices remain but groups are segregated, typified 
by the Dutch policy of the same name from the 1970s to the 1990s), or 
the idea of a “melting pot” (immigrant groups interact freely with the 
host culture and there is no state intervention, the United States being 
a commonly cited though imperfect example). Arguing that none of 
these three models explains the experience of Muslims in Western 
society, Roy suggests that Western Muslims go through a process of 
individual identity construction. He acknowledges that Muslims have 
lived as minorities in non-Muslim lands for centuries, yet the contem-
porary experience of deterritorialization is different:
While old minorities had time to build their own culture or to share 
the dominant culture (Tatars, Indian Muslims, China’s Hui), Muslims in 
recently settled minorities have to reinvent what makes them Muslim, in 
the sense that the common defining factor of this population as Muslim 
is the mere reference to Islam, with no common cultural or linguistic 
heritage.20
The new identity is a hybrid of Western ideas and Islamic prin-
ciples. This interaction creates a religiosity that stresses “individualisa-
tion, the quest for self-realisation, the re-thinking of Islam outside of a 
given culture, and the recasting of the Muslim ummah in non-territo-
rial terms.”21 By examining the vast corpus of contemporary Muslim 
discourse, especially Internet forums, Roy is able to provide ample 
evidence to support this claim. Among second-generation Muslims 
in Europe, there seems to be a tendency to hyper-individualize Islam, 
which can lead to either a rejection of the faith and its attached cultural 
significance or a quest for a pristine, untainted version of Islam. It is in 
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the latter case that the radical project enters the equation, as it offers a 
supposedly true, non-Westernized interpretation of the Qur’an. I dis-
cuss this idea further in the next section, looking specifically at the case 
of Mohammed B.
It should be noted that Roy’s monolithic understanding of “Muslim 
immigrants” is problematic, as is his oversimplification of the choices 
faced by Muslims (atheism and neo-fundamentalism), yet the idea 
of a unique process of identity construction is nonetheless valuable. 
Amartya Sen, in Identity and Violence, puts forward a similar argument 
that stresses the importance of the individual in the process of identity 
construction. This is not to say that societal factors play no role with 
regard to how we perceive ourselves, but rather that there is an element 
of critical self-examination that takes place and should not be ignored. 
To put it succinctly, it is important to keep in mind that while macro- 
and meso-level analyses are certainly important, it is at the individual 
level that identities, including that of the jihadist, are created.
To further understand the role of globalization in the rise of contem-
porary jihadist violence, we must first acknowledge that this phenom-
enon is a project with a clear structural hierarchy and definite aims.22 
Thus, while it is important to look at socio-historical context, we can-
not ignore the role of the movement itself. Here once again we see how 
globalization processes have facilitated the spread of radical Islamist 
ideologies.
With regard to the “project,” it is important to look at how radical 
ideas are created and spread. Improvements in communication tech-
nology and the increasing ease of international financial transactions 
have meant that interactions across countries and continents no longer 
pose a barrier. Groups like Al Qaeda have been able to plant radical 
imams in the West, as evidenced by cases like Anwar al-Aulaqi in 
the United States,23 Abu Hamza in the United Kingdom,24 and Abou 
Khaled in the Netherlands.25 It is difficult to imagine such a level of 
global coordination in an era with less “time-space compression,” 
to use Harvey’s terminology. In addition, the Internet has played an 
important role in the dissemination of violent radicalism. The World 
Wide Web can be used to identify and exploit sympathizers (fund 
raise), spread propaganda (recruit and motivate), maintain anonymity, 
magnify the perception of the power of radical groups, function as a 
command and control center, and gather information on potential tar-
gets.26 In a 2004 article, Brigit Bräuchler explores how radical Islamic 
groups consider the Internet an important tool, not only to plan and 
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implement terrorist attacks but even to support the creation of the 
neo-fundamentalist thoughts and ideas.27 Bräuchler notes that radical 
Islamic groups use the Internet to “construct an identity that is congru-
ent with their offline philosophy but extends its reach.”28 She proceeds 
to discuss how, by offering skewed interpretations of religious and 
historical texts like the Qur’an and the hadith, as well contemporary 
news, radical groups are able to reach “a wide range of people whose 
perception of Islam is strongly influenced by these presentations.”29 
The Internet has allowed contemporary jihadists to convert youth to 
their radical ideology, communicate while remaining anonymous, and 
plan attacks without being geographically present.
A key question now arises: how should Western Muslims react to 
the historical humiliations, given that they live in an era of globaliza-
tion with a worldwide project aimed at recruiting them for violent pur-
poses? For many Muslims living in the West, dealing with humiliation 
may not be an important enough issue to affect daily life. But for some, 
especially those marginalized by other factors, when the deterritorial-
izing force of globalization and the radical Islamist project are added 
to the mix of historical humiliation, then violent, neo-fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam become attractive. Yet an aggressively reac-
tionary response is only one potential outcome of the contemporary 
Western Muslim experience. As I will discuss in the final section, a 
cosmopolitan reaction is also possible and, according to Jytte Klau-
sen, already taking shape. It is important to note two aforementioned 
points; first, only a tiny proportion of Western Muslims are tempted by 
the jihadist ideology promoted by the radicals and, second, the process 
of radicalization is not mechanical in nature. This is especially signifi-
cant in light of Roy’s and Sen’s emphasis on the individual element in 
identity construction. There are a number of unique factors that affect 
each individual decision. In the following section, I hope to tease out 
some of these as I compare radicalization processes in the United States 
and Western Europe and then, in the penultimate section, discuss the 
case of Mohammed B.
VI. Radicalization in the United States and Europe
As I have highlighted throughout this essay, it is important to look 
at world-level trends but also specific experiences to understand the 
allure of the radical. Comparing radicalization processes in two differ-
ent places is one way to identify more specific factors at work. Here, I 
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begin with a brief discussion of the history of Muslims in Europe and 
the United States, followed by an analysis of demographic differences 
between Muslims on both sides of the Atlantic and how strongly jihad-
ist ideologies resonate in both groups. This is intertwined with some 
primary observations made during my time studying in St. Paul, Min-
nesota, and Maastricht in the Netherlands. Finally, by focusing on the 
case of Mohammed B., I discuss an individual example of radicaliza-
tion.
The history of Islam’s interaction with Europe is decidedly differ-
ent than with the United States. Islam reached Europe by the start of 
the 9th century, although likely much earlier. From the 10th to the end 
of the 15th century, large parts of Spain and Portugal, as well as Sicily 
and areas of southern Italy (though for shorter periods of time), were 
under Muslim rule.30 Right up until the early 20th century, the Muslim 
world, in the form of the Ottoman Empire, remained at the doorstep 
of Europe. However, large Muslim populations only began migrating 
to Western Europe in the 1950s, primarily as labor for post-War recon-
struction. The large majority of these migrants were men and, once the 
reconstruction projects were complete, they were expected to return to 
their countries of origin.31 This repatriation, however, never happened. 
Since then, despite regular attempts by Western European govern-
ments to make immigration more difficult, migrants, the majority of 
them Muslim, have continued to arrive in large numbers.
In the early history of the United States, Islam plays a trivial role.32 
The first Muslims to arrive in America in significant numbers were 
slaves from West Africa. While no accurate numbers exist, historians 
estimate that as many as 20% of slaves brought to the U.S. may have 
been Muslims.33 Despite some notable exceptions, slaves were either 
not permitted to practice their religion or forcibly converted to Chris-
tianity. Recently, musicologists have noted the similarities between the 
Blues genre of music and Muslim calls to prayer as one of few lin-
gering, though unrecognized, traditions linking contemporary Amer-
ica with Muslim Africa.34 While small groups of Muslim immigrants 
arrived during the 19th and early 20th centuries, it was not until more 
recent decades that Muslim immigrants have arrived in significant 
numbers. Some 39% of America’s Muslims have only arrived since 
1990.35 It is also important to point out here the Nation of Islam com-
munity, founded in 1930, which introduced an unusual brand of Islam 
to America’s Black population. While in recent years the organiza-
tion has fallen more in line with mainstream Islam, its early teach-
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ings included the belief that the founder of the Nation of Islam was a 
“savior sent by God” and that “spaceships hovering above the earth 
will eventually play a major role in smiting sinners and rescuing the 
righteous.”36 It is critical, therefore, to keep in mind that the Islam 
discussed in the American context may be different from Islam at the 
global level, although in all fairness, the Nation of Islam’s influence 
and significance is presently minimal.
With an understanding of the history of Islam in the United States 
and Europe, we can now discuss current trends. As mentioned above, 
in both Europe and the United States, Muslim immigration has taken 
off in recent decades. In terms of both number and percentage, how-
ever, Muslims constitute a far larger share on the eastern side of the 
Atlantic. Since neither the U.S. nor any of the Western European gov-
ernments include questions regarding religion in their respective cen-
suses, accurate figures are hard to come by. The best estimates, though, 
put the number of American Muslims between 2.5 million (or 0.8% 
of the population)37 and six million (2%),38 while the corresponding 
population in Germany is three million (3.6%), five million (8.0%) in 
France, one million (2.3%) in Spain, and 945,000 (5.8%) in the Neth-
erlands.39 These numbers, however, do not tell us much. More inter-
esting results are found in a 2007 study by the Pew Research Center, 
titled “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,” 
that attempts to understand the “demographics, attitudes, and experi-
ences” of the American Muslim population. While the majority of the 
study is focused on the United States, important comparisons with 
Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain are also made.
Perhaps the most striking statistic found by the Pew study regards 
poverty. In the U.S., Muslim poverty rates are 2% higher than the 
national average while the corresponding number for France and Ger-
many is 18% and even higher in Britain and Spain. In a similar vein, 
71% of American Muslims believe that hard work will lead to success, 
which is higher than the national average of 64%. These data paint 
a picture of a middle class and upwardly mobile group of people, 
quite unlike the stereotypical image of immigrant ghettoes in Europe, 
where radical preachers often find willing listeners in marginalized 
youth. While 8% of respondents in the U.S. said that suicide bomb-
ings were justifiable under certain circumstances, the corresponding 
figure was 15% or more in France, Spain, and Great Britain. Support 
for Al Qaeda was also lower than in European countries. Interestingly, 
though, young American Muslims under the age of 30 are about twice 
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as likely to both condone suicide bombings and support Al Qaeda, a 
proportion that holds true in the European case as well.
A final point from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey can be made 
with regard to the religiosity of Americans and Western Europeans. 
While Europe is regarded as secular and largely non-religious, religion 
continues to play an important role in the lives of Americans. Inter-
estingly, more Christians visit churches weekly (45%) than Muslims 
visit mosques (40%). Being devoutly religious in Europe can perhaps 
lead to further marginalization as it is contrary to the majority prac-
tice. Despite the presence of parties like the Christian Democrats in 
many European countries, the overwhelming majority of Europeans 
agree that religion should play no role in politics and policy-making.40 
This is in strong contrast to the United States, where politicians are 
expected to lobby religious groups and references to God are common 
in political speeches. While it is true that by and large these groups 
are Christian, it is nonetheless worth noting that religion is considered 
important and valuable, whereas in Europe it is not. It is not difficult to 
imagine, then, that European Muslims may feel looked down upon for 
being devout practitioners.
My experience in Maastricht, where two of the city’s larges cathe-
drals are now a bookshop and a hotel, does at first glance support 
the notion that Europe has broken from its religious past. Yet I do not 
believe that this break is as complete as it is imagined. As Jytte Klausen 
has argued in The Islamic Challenge, Europe’s Christian past and the 
religion’s contemporary influence is hidden yet pervasive. Unlike in 
the United States, where Church and State are legally separate, many 
European countries, including the Netherlands, have a long history 
of funding churches and Christian schools (France is a notable excep-
tion). Yet, as Klausen points out, similar projects supporting mosques 
and Muslim schools are a recent phenomenon, even though large, 
concentrated Muslim populations have lived in Europe for decades. 
While the general European population may not be as devout as in the 
United States, the influence of Christianity is never far away, as evi-
denced by the recent debate in the European Union regarding whether 
or not “Christian values” are a part of being European. The celebration 
of Christian events happens with as much festivity in Europe as in the 
United States, and the Sabbath is militantly observed. These seemingly 
trivial points do add up, indicating that Europe is not as “post-reli-
gious” as Europeans seem to think. This paradoxical situation, where 
Europe is supposed to be non-religious yet continues to exhibit many 
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characteristics of a Christian society, could leave non-Christians feel-
ing confused and cheated—why are practitioners looked down upon 
when religion continues to be important in the larger social context?
The situation in the United States, where religion plays an important 
role in the social sphere, is markedly different. The European double 
standard (claiming to be non-religious yet being culturally Christian) 
does not exist, or at least not to the same level. American Muslims, 
though, continue to feel discriminated against, as indicated by the Pew 
survey in which 25% of respondents (41% of native born and 18% of 
foreign born) said they had been victims of discrimination during their 
time in the U.S. While I could not find a corresponding figure for Euro-
pean states, there have been a number of econometric studies showing 
labor market discrimination in Europe.41 However, a key point to keep 
in mind is the earlier demographic data showing Muslims in the U.S. 
as being relatively better off than Muslims in Europe. It is likely that 
job discrimination will have the heightened effect of frustration and 
humiliation on those from poor backgrounds and with unsure pros-
pects.
In my two-and-a-half years living in the United States, the only 
visible cases of discrimination I have encountered have been at the 
airport. “Muslim-looking” people, including Indians like me, are rou-
tinely selected for “random” security checks. Being separated from the 
rest of the passengers and being searched more thoroughly is without 
doubt a humiliating experience, especially so when it happens over 
and over again. While paranoia in the aftermath of 9/11 is understand-
able, cases like that of Omar Rana, an eight-year-old boy whose name 
is on a terror blacklist, are both absurd and frightening. Every time 
Rana goes through airport security, he is pulled aside from his family 
and screened individually.42 This extent of racial profiling is bound 
to become increasingly frustrating for Muslims over time. Surely an 
eight-year-old child does not pose a threat to the national security of 
any country. Muslims in America have seemed relatively well inte-
grated, however. Policies like racial profiling at airports, the Guan-
tanamo Bay detention center, and the USA PATRIOT Act have the 
potential to change that condition.
In my research and experience, it seems as if Europe’s young Mus-
lims are exposed to more situations in which radicalization becomes 
tempting. Not surprisingly, then, recent attacks in the U.S. and West-
ern Europe, specifically those in New York City, Madrid, and Lon-
don, have been planned in Europe and many of the perpetrators have 
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spent significant parts of their lives in Europe. Even the one attack in 
the United States was orchestrated in Hamburg, Germany, while the 
London attacks were carried out by four citizens of Great Britain. Dur-
ing my participation in the Globalization in Comparative Perspective 
program, though, one case was brought up more often than any other: 
that of Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of Dutch filmmaker Theo 
van Gogh.
VII. The Radicalization of Mohammed B.
The case of Mohammed B., as he is most commonly known, brings 
together several of the important factors behind radicalization dis-
cussed above. At the same time, having an individual case study also 
allows us to see that the process of radicalization is not a mechani-
cal one. Born to first-generation Moroccan immigrants, Mohammed 
B. went to university, had a Dutch girlfriend, enjoyed drinking beer 
and smoking marijuana with both other immigrants and ethnic Dutch 
friends, and seemed like a case of multiculturalism going well. Yet over 
the course of a year, starting in February 2003, he completely deserted 
“Western values” and became increasingly radical.43 Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, this radicalization occurred immediately after a number of 
personal setbacks: his mother passed away, he was rejected by a num-
ber of employers, and a community center he was working to build 
was refused funding by the government. He blamed the Netherlands’ 
unfair treatment of Muslims for these events. Around the same time, 
Mohammed began meeting Abou Khaled, a radical Syrian preacher 
with possible ties to Al Qaeda. Khaled taught Mohammed B. and his 
“close circle of like-minded friends” (what would become the Hofstad 
Network) a violent, radical version of Islam with a specific focus on 
hating the “infidels.”44
While trying to determine what, if any, role the historical humilia-
tions of Islam played in Mohammed’s radicalization would be largely 
speculative, we do have an idea of his views on the religion through 
his postings on Internet forums. Mohammed believed that, “Muslim 
people were enslaved by Western lollipops [and] had reached the low-
est point in their history.”45 It is likely, then, that Mohammed was 
aware of and, especially in light of his own failures and losses, expe-
rienced a heightened sense of humiliation for being Muslim. In a time 
of personal crisis, Mohammed turned to neo-fundamentalist Islam, a 
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source that gave him an authority figure and a clearly demarcated set 
of rules and ideals to live by and live for.
Yet despite Mohammed’s increasing devotion to Islam, he “remained 
incredibly Dutch.”46 His approach to violence came from a very indi-
vidualized internalization of jihadist Islam. For Mohammed, this was 
not a fight for Islam in Israel or Chechnya or Iraq, but rather in the 
Netherlands. As he stated during his trial, Mohammed could not live 
in a liberal democratic society because free speech allowed people to 
insult Allah and the Qur’an.47 Yet it was exactly through the political 
liberties afforded to the Dutch that Mohammed planned on waging his 
larger battle. He wrote:
Since the Dutch political system encourages its citizens (especially the 
alochtonen, the Muslims) to take an active part in the problems of soci-
ety…people did indeed rise to take on social responsibilities. Such peo-
ple not only shouldered responsibilities for The Netherlands, but for the 
whole world. They will liberate the world from democratic slavery.48
As Buruma notes, despite his pessimistic view regarding the state of 
Islam in the world, Mohammed believed that “rescue was at hand” 
because “the knights of Islam would rise from…the Netherlands.”49
The radicalization of Mohammed demonstrates the immense com-
plexity of trying to understand globalist radical Islam. It is difficult to 
reach definitive conclusions, but we can be fairly confident in argu-
ing that Mohammed was aware of and experienced the humiliation 
of being a Muslim in the West. The role of globalization is evident at 
several levels. While Mohammed was a second-generation Moroccan, 
his radical preacher was a Syrian, and they both had globalist ambi-
tions of rescuing Islam from “Western lollipops.” Finally, it must be 
pointed out that a number of individual circumstances and choices 
also played a part in Mohammed’s radicalization. His radical identity 
was not entirely a product of his historical situation or a response to 
globalization or a conscious choice; it was a combination of all three of 
these factors.
VIII. Conclusion
Contemporary jihadist violence is a complex phenomenon, one that 
cannot be understood in a straightforward mechanical way. Presently, 
the bulk of the literature dealing with the issue takes too narrow a per-
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spective by either focusing on a specific time period or creating imag-
ined civilizational boundaries. Additionally, perhaps in the interest of 
finding easy narratives, scholars have tended to ignore the complexity 
of identity construction. While this essay certainly does not answer 
every question regarding the matter, the aim is simply to open new 
lines of enquiry and to try to understand the immense complexity of 
contemporary jihadist violence.
The question that naturally follows such a study is “What can we 
do?” The first step is to understand that there is no “quick fix” solution. 
Contemporary jihadist violence is a product of our historical moment. 
Campaigns like the “War on Terror” are misleading and probably 
counterproductive, as they give the impression that there is a clear, 
identifiable enemy that can be eliminated. Yet this is far from the case. 
“Borders and frontiers are no longer territorial,” notes Roy. “There is 
no wall defending the enemy, an enemy that is more often than not too 
elusive to be named and targeted, an enemy who if he is shadowy is 
sometimes merely our shadow.”50
Instead, in this era of globalization, we need to ensure that imagined 
boundaries, by way of exclusion and discrimination, do not drive disil-
lusioned youths to violence. Adopting a cosmopolitan worldview at 
the individual, state, and transnational levels would be a step in the 
right direction, though this would require critical adaptation from all 
involved.
But this is not enough. To counter the allure of the radical, creating a 
prevailing sense of justice would be a huge step in the right direction. 
When class divisions are removed from the equation, violent radical-
ism loses much of its appeal. A discussion of how this should be done 
is beyond the scope of this article, but it is important nonetheless to 
recognize the centrality of justice in a globalizing society.
At a more micro level, it is vital to look beyond rigid definitions 
and meanings of identity, what Sen calls “the illusion of destiny,”51 
and adopt a more cosmopolitan outlook. From the Muslim commu-
nity, perhaps especially in the West, there is a need for leadership 
and vision to engage with globalization and decrease the appeal of 
reactionary radicalism. Scholars like Tariq Ramadan, who argues that 
Muslims in Europe need to create a “European Islam,” offer hope that 
neo-fundamentalism is not the only religious track that young Mus-
lims can identify with and follow. As Klausen has noted, the genesis of 
this European Islam seems to already begun. Two specific areas where 
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there is particular urgency, she notes, are with regard to the role of 
women and the acceptance of homosexuality.52
On the part of the West, populist politicians using anti-Islamic plat-
forms are surely doing more harm than good. It is almost as though 
these leaders are bent on making Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” 
theory a reality. Yet the vast majority of leaders, Muslim and Christian, 
are secular in their political outlook. A point of tension is likely to be 
freedom of speech, an issue dear to Europeans. It may be time, though, 
for European governments to learn from the United States and initiate 
anti-hate-speech laws, making it illegal to deride and disgrace reli-
gions, race, and other sensitive constituents of the body politic. In an 
era of increasing globalization, there is certainly a need for discussion 
and debate, yet there must be defined boundaries. Respect and toler-
ance will be difficult to foster in an environment where anything and 
everything is a legitimate target of ridicule.
On a transnational level, there are certain steps that would reduce 
the temptations of radical Islam. Allowing for a stronger Muslim voice 
on the world stage would be a significant improvement. Currently, 
none of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council has a Muslim majority, even though the religion has more 
than a billion followers worldwide. Security Council reform is desper-
ately needed for many reasons. Perhaps responding to globalist radical 
Islam will give the process a sense of urgency.
Finally, a conscious effort to reexamine the sources of our knowl-
edge and an acknowledgement of the contributions of the non-Western 
world in science, the arts, and philosophy would reduce the anti-West 
sentiment seen around the world (not to mention offer a more accurate 
understanding of the subject matter!). At present, largely due to the 
West’s domination in the educational sphere, there is little acknowledg-
ment of the plural origins of many of the ideas we hold dear. A sincere 
effort at recognizing the contributions of the non-West is desperately 
needed in order to accurately understand the two big questions of 
“where we are” and “how we got here.” In the work of scholars like 
Sen (see especially his Argumentative Indian), there is an attempt to 
tease out the historical roots of science and philosophy, yet more exam-
ination is needed and at a larger scale.
Globalization has been studied in the last few decades as a phenom-
enon with the potential to bring people together as well as to push 
them apart. In the world today we see many examples of both the 
uniting and the fragmenting attributes of globalization. People from all 
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walks of life and all over the planet come together and offer help when 
there is a natural disaster in Myanmar or New Orleans, while others 
fight against the implementation of neo-liberal policies in Bolivia and 
the Westernization of India. What we must understand is that global-
ization is not inherently good or bad. What we do with it will deter-
mine what it becomes. •
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